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Michael Fleshman  
Drawing on his research on the structure of remuneration in the financial industry and on a 
collective project underway studying the evolution of inequalities in ten countries, Olivier 
Godechot, CNRS Senior researcher, codirector of the MaxPo,  shows that the decline in 
financial activity following the crisis and the regulation of the sector did not necessarily 
reduce remuneration in finance and, consequently, the level of national wage inequality. 
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Ten years ago, the bankruptcies and bailouts of a large number of banks and insurance 
companies rocked the global economy and led to much reflection about the causes of the 
crisis. The harmful role of bonuses, and their continuation throughout the crisis, caused public 
outrage, spurring the Occupy Wall Street movement in the fall of 2011. The movement 
denounced, among other things, the influence of finance and its role in increasing inequality. 
Inequalities preexisting the crisis 
These questions inspired a series of academic studies in the early 2010s that confirmed the 
leading role of the financial sector in increasing inequality. Thus, throughout the 20th century, 
the US financial sector paid its employees better than other sectors. This sectoral advantage, 
which changed over the period – reaching +50% in the mid-2000s – played a role in wage 
inequality. The breakdown of these inequalities by income group shows that growing income 
among the top 1% in the United States between 1997 and 2005 mainly benefited people 
working in finance. Similar phenomena occurred in both France and the United Kingdom. 
However, these works – published at the beginning of the 2010s – focus on wage 
developments before the crisis and do not analyze subsequent developments, for lack of 
sufficiently detailed data. 
The reduction in financial activity and adoption of new regulations – particularly on 
monitoring remuneration – could have led to a decline in financial remuneration and a 
consequent reduction in inequality. 
Factors in bonus reductions 
As figure 1 shows, the volume of transactions on national stock exchanges, which 
experienced very strong growth during the 1990s, fell sharply after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 This lower activity, combined with the recapitalization of banks, losses related to the 
liquidation of bad loans, and the reduction in income from financial intermediation, 
significantly reduced the profitability of large banks, impacting the budget allocated to bonus 
payments. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent future crises, financial regulatory institutions proposed new 
measures to limit risk-taking: increase the equity capital required to carry out financial 
activities, outsource the riskiest activities and, in response to the bonus scandal, regulate 
remuneration. In 2009, the G20 Financial Stability Board (FSB) called on banks to adopt 
these good compensation practices over the long term. For example, it recommended a 
rebalancing of remuneration in favor of fixed salaries and a system of deferred bonuses 
indexed not only to profits but also to risks, and even a system of penalties in the event of 
losses. The United States and the European Union adopted divergent approaches to 
implementation. In 2014, the United States introduced the Volcker rule, which limited banks’ 
ability to carry out transactions on their own account, but little was done to regulate 
remuneration. On the other hand, the European Union has not yet adopted the equivalent of 
the Volcker rule, but adopted the FSB’s recommendations on remuneration in 2010 via the 
CRD III Directive. Under pressure from the European Parliament, the EU went even further 
by introducing a bonus cap of 200% of fixed salary in 2013 (CRD IV Directive). 
 
A true decrease in bonuses? 
The collection of data on remunerations in finance, albeit a partial one, offers significant 
insight into their state before and after the crisis. Figure 2 shows the vertiginous evolution of 
average bonuses on Wall Street since the 1980s. It is certainly worth noting that the 2008 
crisis led to a halving of bonuses in the two consecutive years. However, the bonuses were 
remarkably resilient and quickly recovered to reach levels above the 2001 peak, and in 2017 
almost reached the 2006 all-time high. 
Figure 2. Evolution of bonuses and number of employees on Wall Street 
 
Reading: In 2018, the 175,000 Wall Street employees (left scale) averaged $ 150,000 in annual bonuses. 
Sources: New York State Tax Controller 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the ten largest remunerations in four French banks on the 
basis of their social reports. These are remunerations paid to “market specialists”, i.e. a very 
small elite of trading, trading room or investment banking team leaders. During the 1990s and 
2000s, these remunerations increased at a spectacular rate, rising in the case of Société 
Générale from 280,000 euros at the end of the 1970s to nearly 8,000,000 in 2007, for 2006 
performance. Losses related to the Kerviel affair and the subprime crisis, both of which 
occurred in 2008, reduced these remunerations by a factor of four. However, even after this 
decline, wages remained high and started rising again. In addition, the implementation of the 
European bonus cap in 2014 did not result in a significant reduction in remuneration in these 
two banks. Variable salaries for employees in market activities certainly fell by 40% between 
2013 and 2014. But their fixed salaries increased by 73% at Société Générale, and 52% at 
BNP. This bonus limitation ultimately did little to moderate bonuses, at least in the short term. 
Figure 3: average earnings of the ten highest paid employees from 1978 to 2018 in 
constant euros 
 
Reading: in 2007 (for the year 2006), the ten best paid employees of Société Générale received an average of 8 
million euros (euro 2018). Source: social reports 
One might describe the glass as half full or half empty. We can conclude from this first 
examination that financial compensation significantly fell in the aftermath of the crisis (more 
because of the decline in financial activity than the compensation regulation), or on the 
contrary, that it remained very high over the period, and even higher than compensation in 
other sectors. 
The impact on inequalities 
By using administrative data on nine countries (France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, 
Germany, Spain, Hungary, and Japan) developed as part of the collective COIN project 
(Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2017), and the results of the CPS survey for the United States it is 
possible to assess the impact of financial euphoria and crisis on national wage inequality. 
First, let us examine the evolution of wage inequality in ten countries (Figure 4). As figure 4 
shows, the wage share of the top 1% consistently increased from the early 1990s to the 2008 
crisis at an annual rate of +2% per year. 
 
However, the evolution of wage inequalities after the crisis is less well known. Inequality in 
the sample generally fell (particularly in Canada, Sweden, France and Norway), except in 
Denmark and perhaps the United States. 
To what extent was finance responsible for these developments? Before the crisis, finance 
was a major driver of increasing inequality. For example, in Sweden, half of the increase in 
the top 1% share went to employees in the financial sector, as did 45% in France, 36% in 
Denmark, and a fifth in the United States, Germany, Canada, and Norway. Finance was 
negatively correlated with increasing inequality in Hungary and Japan – two countries with 




Contribution of finance to the evolution of inequalities before and after the crisis 
 
Reading; In Canada, the share of the top 1% of wages in the Canadian payroll grew at a rate of 3.8% per year 
between 1993 and 2007. 
Finance contributes 22% of this increase. The overrepresentation of financiers in the top 1% is growing at an 
annual rate of + 2.3% per year. Between 2007 and 2013, the share of the top 1% decreases at a rate of – 4.2% per 
year, finance contributes 15% and the overrepresentation of financiers decreases at a rate of -1.7% per year 
* or subsequent 
** or earlier  
source COIN (see appendix) and survey CPS (United States) 
  
  
The increasing overrepresentation of financiers among the top 1% – a quasi-general 
phenomenon (with the exception of Japan) over the entire pre-crisis period, is another way of 
measuring this phenomenon, as shown in the figure below. 
 After the crisis, the role of finance differed from one country to the next. In Canada, Sweden, 
and Germany, the maxim of financial euphoria – more finance, more inequality – effectively 
reversed to: less finance, less inequality. But this was not the case in France and Norway, 
where finance continued to contribute to growth, and where financiers continued to cluster at 
the top of the national wage hierarchy. In countries where inequalities continued to grow, the 
role of finance also differed from one country to the next. It remained the driving force in 
Denmark. By contrast, in the United States and Japan, finance contributed less to growing 
inequalities than other sectors. 
While the financial crisis might have led us to believe that its excesses lay in the past, this 
examination shows that financial wages declined after 2008, but also remained very high. 
In a previous book (Wages, Bonuses and Appropriation of Profit in the Financial Industry: the 
Working Rich), I discussed some of the reasons for sticky-remuneration. Because gains are 
intended and pursued, it is easy to assign responsibility for them and reward them. On the 
other hand, because losses are never sought, they are easily seen as resulting from bad luck 
and are less heavily penalized. These structural factors may explain why it is so common for 
banks to continue to pay substantial bonuses to operators who have racked losses (considered 
cyclical), for fear of seeing their top talent join the competition. 
Diverging national results 
Our second finding is that countries after the crisis showed striking contrasts. While the 
decline in financial activity and inequality were correlated in Sweden and Canada, financial 
wages continued to be a driver of rising inequality in France, Denmark and Norway. 
This divergence in post-crisis developments probably reflects differences in how governments 
and banks managed them (Woll, 2014), in the financial specializations of different countries, 
and in norms surrounding wage inequality. In the United States, where finance significantly 
contributed to rising inequality in the second half of the 1980s, inequality norms gradually 
spread to other sectors, and particularly to big tech, somewhat relativizing the financial 
sector’s role. In Sweden, on the other hand, market finance proved to be an unequal niche in 
an economic structure that remains “social-democratic”. The level of national inequality, 
which is still low, accordingly varies with the rhythms of financial activity. Finally, in 
Norway, the financial sector was until recently underdeveloped in market activities and 
focused on retail banking activities, yielding a relatively egalitarian remuneration structure in 
finance. Only recently has market finance developed there, with the emergence of activity 
around sovereign wealth funds. Norway then quickly converged with other countries in terms 
of the concentration of financiers in the wage elite. 
These few contrasting elements are just the first steps to further exploring the diversity of 
unequal trajectories after 2008. 
*This article is based on data from a survey carried out with Paula Apascaritei (Spanish 
data), István Boza (Hungarian data), Martin Hallsten (Swedish data), Lasse Henriksen 
(Danish data), Are Hermansen (Norwegian data), Feng Hou (Canadian data), Elvira Marta 
(German data), Silvia Maja Melzer (German data), Halil Sabanci (Spanish data), Naomi 
Kodama (Japanese data), Max Thaning (Swedish data). 
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Appendix:  
COIN (Comparative Organizational Inequality Network) is a consortium of researchers led by 
Don Tomaskovic-Devey (2017) that studies organizational inequalities based on employer-
employee administrative data on wages. We use exhaustive data for Canada (Statistics 
Canada), Norway (Statistics Norway), Sweden (Statistics Sweden), Denmark (RAS, IDAN 
and BES), and France (DADS in the private and semi-public sector). For Hungary (NMH 
Wage Survey), the sample covers half of the employees. In Japan (Basic Wage Survey), 
Germany (IEBS), and Spain (Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH) and tax 
records), the samples cover 4 to 6% of the employed population. In Germany, reported wages 
are capped at a relatively low level (at the level of the upper decile threshold). We imputed 
the high salaries with the available information. However, this technique is imperfect and 
some imprecision remains. In Japan, salaried executives are not included in the data, and this 
might reduce the level and evolution of inequalities. 
Learn more: Tomaskovic-Devey Donald et al.. 2017. « The Comparative Organizational 
Inequality Network: Toward an Economic Sociology of Inequality », economic sociology_the 
european electronic newsletter, vol. 19, n°1, p. 15-21. 
 
